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Social enterprises are being promoted as responsive and 
innovative way to deliver public services. As part of this 
promotion, these organizations are being required to demonstrate 
the social and economic value they generate. Social return on 
investment (SROI) is a performance measurement tool currently 
being encouraged to capture this impact. This paper draws on 
survey and interview data to analyse how SROI is used and 
understood in health and social care settings. It indicates that 
despite being accepted as an internationally recognized 
measurement tool for social enterprise, SROI is underused and 
undervalued due to practical and ideological barriers. 
Introduction 
Trends in public management draw attention to the decline and 
fragmentation of established bureaucracies in the face of an 
increasingly complex and plural system involving the public, 
private and third sector (e.g. Osborne, 2006).  This is no more so 
than in health and social care where recent reform efforts have 
sought to diversify provision in order to stimulate competition and 
choice (Allen, 2009).  One notable supply side reform has been 
the introduction of social enterprise. In recent years, English 
health and social care policy has encouraged NHS professionals 
and community groups to set up their own social enterprises. It 
has done so based on the belief that such organizational forms 
have the potential to deliver greater responsiveness, efficiency 
and cost effectiveness (Department of Health, 2006, 2010).  
The rise of social enterprise is based on their apparent 
achievement of a double or even triple ‘bottom line’ in combining 
environmental and social aims with trading viability through 
innovative approaches to service delivery (Dart, 2004; Fazzi, 2012; 
Harding, 2004; Teasdale, 2012). As with the third sector more 
broadly, such organizations are increasingly required to have 
formal standards and measures of performance in place. They are 
being called upon to assess the outcomes of their activity in order 
to demonstrate their social, economic and environmental value 
(Bull, 2007; Office of the Third Sector (OTS), 2009; Ryan and Lyne, 
2008).  This need to generate evidence on outcomes is by no 
means straightforward, as social enterprises may face difficulties 
in ‘unravelling performance’ (Paton, 2003:5). It is often argued 
that emphasis on outcomes and evidence-based performance 
misses out key aspects of third sector activity and functioning. 
Evidently, there tends to be a lack of understanding about the 
business models they use (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2002; Haugh, 2005).  
A range of performance measurement tools have been introduced 
and utilized by social enterprises. A technique widely advocated is 
Social Return on Investment (SROI), which is designed to 
understand, manage and report on the social, environmental and 
economic value created by an organization (New Economics 
Foundation (NEF), 2004). In the UK, policy makers have actively 
encouraged social enterprises to measure their social value using 
SROI (Nicholls, 2007). In health and social care, the Department of 
Health encouraged SROI in England as a way for social enterprises 
to understand and share their value (Department of Health, 2010). 
It also established the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) to 
support social enterprise entry into the NHS market and made 
SROI a feature of its funding to encourage social returns. The SEIF, 
which began in 2007, provides financial and business support to 
new and existing social enterprises in health and social care. 
Social return on investment has emerged as a preferred technique 
for measuring impact and outcomes. As a result, the promotion of 
SROI is now extending beyond the US and UK as a global product. 
There have been notable recent publications of SROI in Chinese 
and French (SROI Network, 2011) and SROI membership 
organizations, such as the SROI Network, have members from 
across the globe. Whilst this technique is presented as a crucial 
development in capturing third sector outcomes, there is limited 
empirical evidence on its use by social enterprises. Furthermore, 
the relatively scarce literature that does exist suggests a number 
of practical and implementation issues with its use (Darby and 
Jenkins, 200611. Darby, L. and Jenkins, H. 2006; Peattie, K. and 
Morley, A. 2008.  
The following paper analyses the use of performance 
measurement tools in social enterprise organizations delivering 
health and social care services. Based on its ever increasing 
relevance and apparent popularity as a measurement technique, 
the paper pays particular attention to SROI. It draws on interview 
and survey data collected from organizations who received 
funding from the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) to 
understand how measurement tools are utilized and understood 
by organizations and those who fund social enterprises; issues 
that appear to have been largely neglected from research to date. 
In doing so, the paper provides an important contribution to 
debates about the benefits and potential barriers of SROI for 
social enterprises and the commissioners of services. It 
contributes and responds to calls for research which can help to 
find improved ways to capture and report on the value of social 
enterprises (Peattie and Morley, 2008). 
Social Enterprise in Health and Social Care 
Social enterprise encompasses a large range of organizational 
types and forms. A review by Teasdale (2012) describes how the 
social enterprise discourse has been used to describe voluntary 
organizations delivering public services, democratically controlled 
organizations blending social and economic goals, 
profit-orientated businesses with a social conscience and 
community enterprises addressing social problems. Although this 
wide variety has rendered conceptualization problematic 
(Simmons, 2008), the defining characteristics of social enterprises 
rest on the primacy of social aims, the centrality of trading and the 
degree of democratic control and ownership (Peattie and Morley, 
2008). 
Since the late 1990s, the concept of social enterprise has achieved 
policy recognition in many countries and enthusiasm for social 
enterprise in England can be dated to the election of a New 
Labour government in 1997 (Teasdale, 2012). Over the next 
decade the purported benefits of social enterprise expanded 
dramatically and were linked to a wide range of government 
agendas (OTS, 2009). A variety of initiatives introduced to boost 
the sector included the introduction of a Social Enterprise Unit by 
the Department of Trade and Industry in 2002 who developed a 
definition of social enterprise as – ‘business[es] with primarily 
social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for 
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than 
being driven by the need to maximize profit for shareholders and 
owners’ (DTI, 2002). The Office of the Third Sector was established 
in 2006 resulting in the development of a Social Enterprise Action 
Plan (OTS, 2006). 
In health and social care, social enterprise has resonated with 
supply side reform of service delivery to stimulate competition 
and choice (Allen, 2009; Heins et al., 2010). Through its 
combination of social goals and business practices, it has been 
argued that social enterprise can encourage greater efficiency, as 
well as an entrepreneurial approach to promote innovation and 
improve quality (Department of Health, 2010; National Audit 
Office, 2011). In England, a variety of policy initiatives have sought 
to encourage NHS staff to set up social enterprises as a means of 
‘unleashing public sector entrepreneurship’ (Department of 
Health, 200614. Department of Health. 2006: 173), including NHS 
employees in England being given a ‘Right to Request’ to set up 
social enterprises to deliver primary and community services 
(Department of Health, 2009b, 2011). 
The Department of Health also established the Social Enterprise 
Investment Fund (SEIF), which through the provision of funding 
and business support, aimed to build much needed capacity and 
skills within the social enterprise sector, enabling organizations to 
adapt to new financial and political environments of public sector 
contracting and business development (see Alcock et al., 
forthcoming; Department of Health, 2009a; Millar et al., 2010). 
One of the SEIF goals was to encourage social enterprises to 
measure and communicate their social return. To achieve this, 
some SEIF investees (12%) were provided with additional funding 
and training (through the SROI Network) to engage in SROI (Alcock 
et al., forthcoming). 
This enthusiasm for social enterprise and social investment 
appears to have continued with the coalition government, who 
have promised to support social enterprises to deliver public 
services in the era of the Big Society (Daly, 2011). There is 
increasing interest in promoting social business and measuring the 
social impact of these organizations. Initiatives include Big Society 
Capital, a £600 million fund to promote the growth of the social 
investment market (Cabinet Office, 2011). There has also been 
increasing interest in Social Impact Bonds as a form of 
outcomes-based contracting, where public sector commissioners 
draw on private investment to pay for significant improvement in 
social outcomes associated with particular interventions 
(seewww.socialfinance.org.uk). 
SROI and Performance Measurement 
As social enterprises come under increasing pressure to measure 
their performance and value (Peattie and Morley, 2008), SROI has 
been encouraged as a means to capture this value. In the UK, it 
has been promoted as a way to enable the social enterprise sector 
to better understand the wider impacts of service delivery and 
quantify that value in monetary terms. Developed by the Roberts 
Enterprise Development Fund in the US (Roberts Enterprise 
Development Fund (REDF), 2000) and tested by the New 
Economics Foundation in the UK (NEF, 2004), SROI is based upon 
the principles of accountancy and cost-benefit analysis that assign 
monetary values to social and environmental returns to 
demonstrate wider value creation (Rotheroe and Richards, 2007). 
This measures the value of social benefits created by an 
organization in relation to the relative cost of achieving those 
benefits (Emerson and Twersky, 1996). The result is a ratio of 
monetized social value. For example, a ratio of 3:1 indicates that 
an investment of £1 delivers £3 of social value.  
SROI =  
Net Present Value of Benefits 
Net Present Value of Investments 
 
Social return on investment uses elements of cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) as costs and benefits are quantified and compared to 
evaluate the desirability of a given intervention expressed in 
monetary units (Layard and Glaister, 1994). Healthcare settings 
are familiar with such cost benefit approaches and the recent 
pursuit of explicit priority setting has been accompanied by the 
development of decision support tools and methodologies 
(Williams, 2011). In addition to CBA, this includes Health 
Technology Assessment (HTAs) and cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) used to evaluate the efficacy, safety, ethics and costs of an 
intervention to help bodies make resource allocation decisions 
(Drummond et al., 1997; Gold et al., 1996; Williams, 2011). 
However, the key difference between CBA and SROI is that SROI 
has its focus on the third sector and explicitly attempts to involve 
stakeholders at every stage (Arvidson et al., 2010) through 
assessing how much stakeholders value the service (New 
Philanthropy Capital, 201042. New Philanthropy Capital. 2010. The 
SROI process can vary from the social value generated by an entire 
organization, or focus on just one specific aspect of the 
organization's work. Social return on investment can be 
evaluative, conducted retrospectively and based on actual 
outcomes that have already taken place; or a forecast, which 
predicts how much social value will be created if the activities 
meet their intended outcomes (Department of Health, 201017. 
Department of Health. 2010.  
There have been a number of success stories documented in 
relation to SROI (e.g. Flockhart, 2005; Ryan and Lynne, 2008). Of 
particular note, in 2009 the Department of Health commissioned 
an action research project on ‘the value of social enterprise in 
health and social care’ (Department of Health, 2010). Five social 
enterprises delivering primary and community care services were 
supported to undertake SROI analysis. Whilst the research 
demonstrated the financial returns created by each organization, 
it also identified a number of additional benefits of SROI, including 
that it could be used to involve stakeholders in more meaningful 
ways. This report also argued that SROI analysis helped social 
enterprises work with commissioners in making sure that their 
value was identified, managed and paid for. 
These findings support the claims made about SROI that it can 
provide not only an opportunity for social enterprises to 
demonstrate their effectiveness but also create a competitive 
advantage by enabling commissioners to make more informed 
decisions when tendering for public sector service contracts (Ryan 
and Lynne, 2008). It can also enable stronger relationships 
between investors and the organizations they support (Social 
Ventures Australia (SVA) Consulting, 2012). Social return on 
investment can also be useful internally as an instrument for 
organizational learning by enabling staff to analyse and improve 
their services (Arvidson 2009); New Philanthropy Capital 2010). 
Social return on investment has therefore been argued to enable 
organizations to learn what is and isn't working and use this to 
improve their strategy, as well as strengthen management and 
monitoring systems (SVA Consulting, 2012). 
Despite this apparent success, literature in this area draws 
attention to the limited uptake of measurement tools, including 
SROI, by social enterprises (Nicholls, 2007; Peatte and Morley, 
2008). Sheridan (2011) analysed data from the State of Social 
Enterprise Survey 2009 and found a limited uptake of impact 
measurement tools in the social enterprise sector, with SROI 
coming off worst, being used by only 1% of health and social care 
organizations. This study also found that measuring social and/or 
environmental impact was only done by 65% of health and social 
care organizations. Of those that did measure their impact, most 
used internal tools/systems (17%) or social audit (11%). 
A number of practical issues have been put forward to explain 
why social enterprises are not using SROI and other measurement 
tools. This includes the difficulty of attributing a financial figure to 
‘soft’ outcomes such as confidence or self-esteem (Sheridan, 
2011) that involve subjective value judgments (Lingane and Olsen, 
2004; Thomas, 2004). Furthermore, these tools make assumptions 
that conflict with the way organizations are run. For example, 
SROI requires an organization to have a good evidence base and 
financial proxies; however, this data is often unreliable, resulting 
in poor quality SROI reports (New Philanthropy Capital, 2010). 
Furthermore, SROI requires some idea of ‘what would have 
happened anyway’ and this counterfactual data is rarely available 
resulting in considerable calculation errors (New Philanthropy 
Capital, 201042. New Philanthropy Capital. 2010.  
Further practical and implementation problems draw attention to 
the time and resource inputs associated with measurement tools. 
Social enterprises may see measurement as a burden, rather than 
a source of competitive advantage or a useful activity (Social 
Enterprise Partnership UK, 2003). SROI in particular can be costly, 
requiring significant amounts of time and specialist skills (Gair, 
2009; New Philanthropy Capital, 2010). Here, organizational size 
matters as only those organizations with sufficient resources are 
likely to take up performance measurement (Zimmerman and 
Stevens, 2006). Furthermore, Lingane and Olsen (2004) suggest 
organizations are unlikely to spend valuable time and resources on 
impact assessment unless it is seen as important to their 
investors. Conversely, studies suggest that evaluation reports may 
not even be used by funders as a basis for decision making 
(Arvidson, 2009). Funders may not find social value being 
expressed in financial terms very compelling (New Philanthropy 
Capital, 2010). Such findings resonate with the application of cost 
effective tools and techniques in healthcare. Whilst the 
international evidence confirms the use of HTA and economic 
evaluation among national organizations, a disjuncture remains as 
local decision makers operating with fixed healthcare budgets and 
established practices lack the requisite resources and expertise to 
make such priority setting decisions (Williams et al., 2008). 
Ideological issues draw attention to how performance 
measurement tools may clash with the values and culture of social 
enterprises. Some tools, such as social audit and benchmarking, 
originated in the private sector and were adapted to public and 
non-profit contexts. They were originally designed to focus on 
large business models, where rationalization, resource 
maximization, market growth and financial measures are highly 
sought-after (Garengo et al., 2005). However, social enterprises 
may lack the resources and may adopt different business 
ideologies, ethics and organizational structures (Ridley Duff et al., 
2011). The diversity of social enterprises in terms of their activities 
and strategies also mean that universal or standardised 
measurement tools are not appropriate (Hart and Houghton, 
2007). As Paton (2003) suggests, the relevance of ‘mainstream’ 
management ideas and their adaptation to social enterprises 
demonstrates that performance measures may not be the 
universal solution as promised. 
Methods 
Our study of performance measurement formed a key part of a 
national evaluation of the Social Enterprise Investment Fund1 
(SEIF) (see Lyon et al., 2010; Millar et al., 2010). The purpose of 
this evaluation was to assess the effectiveness of SEIF activities in 
enabling the start up and growth of social enterprises in English 
health and social care (see Alcock et al., forthcoming; Hall et al., 
forthcoming). 
The research employed mixed methods carrying out a survey and 
in-depth case studies with a selection of social enterprises which 
had applied to the SEIF. These delivered across a range of 
different service areas to respond to gaps and demands within the 
health and social care system. Most targeted vulnerable and 
excluded groups and aimed to provide a responsive and 
innovative service in meeting individual and community needs. 
Our survey research indicated that SEIF applicants were 
categorized into four key areas; health and wellbeing (62%), 
healthcare (20%), social care (19%), and social exclusion (16%) 
(Hall and Millar, 2011). These social enterprises are therefore not 
representative of all English health and social care services and 
only include those that have received state support through the 
SEIF. 
The survey was undertaken with all successful (n = 285) SEIF 
applicants who had received their investment decision between 
the start of the SEIF on 1 August 2007 and 31 March 2010 (see 
Hall and Millar, 2011). A high response rate of 60% (n = 172) was 
obtained. Non-respondents primarily included those organizations 
that had closed down or where email addresses had changed. For 
the purpose of this paper, we draw upon responses to a series of 
survey questions on impact measurement, which were asked to 
(and answered by) all survey respondents. Using a mixture of 
closed and open questions we asked if participants measure their 
social impact, how they measure impact and the value of 
measuring impact. The survey was administered online, with 
telephone backup. 
The case study research carried out in-depth qualitative interviews 
with a total of 16 social enterprises within four case study sites. 
Three of these sites were defined by geographic locality (using 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) boundaries), while the fourth focused 
thematically on ‘Right to Request’ organizations. The three sites 
defined by locality were selected to obtain a diversity of contexts 
based around the number of SEIF applications, the type and 
amount of SEIF investment made and type/size of social 
enterprise organizations within each locality. The sample was 
purposive in its aim and included a diverse range of successful (n = 
13) and unsuccessful applicants (n = 3) to the SEIF ranging from 
large social enterprises delivering mainstream healthcare services, 
to small local organizations delivering wellbeing services. Two 
(15%) of the successful organizations received SEIF funded SROI 
training (representative of the 12% who received SROI support 
overall). A total of 30 qualitative interviews were carried out with 
representatives from the selected social enterprises. A further 12 
qualitative interviews were carried out with health and social care 
commissioners and social enterprise support agencies. Our 
interviews included questions on impact measurement and the 
extent to which impact measurement tools, including SROI, were 
taken into account when allocating funding and public service 
contracts. 
Quantitative data from the survey were analysed in SPSS using 
descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations. Qualitative data from 
the interviews (and open survey questions) were coded focusing 
on the use of SROI, how it was used and the strengths and 
limitations of the technique. Based on the iterative nature of 
qualitative research, analysis also looked to code wider 
interpretations of measurement activity including understandings 
and conceptions of measurement and measurement tools. This 
analysis of the transcribed interview text was assisted by NVivo 
software (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Quantitative survey data 
were used to explore the use of performance measurement tools 
across all SEIF investees, whilst the qualitative data were used to 
provide insight and depth into the reasons why certain tools were 
(or were not) utilized. Here, triangulation benefitted the research 
in obtaining multiple viewpoints allowing for greater accuracy by 
collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same 
phenomenon (Denzin, 1978). As with other public management 
research (e.g. Boyne et al., 2005; Kitchener et al., 2000), the use of 
multiple measures allowed us to uncover some unique variance 
which otherwise may have been neglected by single methods. 
Measuring the Impact of Social Enterprise Organizations 
The following sections present our findings from both survey and 
interview data of how SROI was utilized by respondents, 
presenting both the advantages of the tool along with the internal 
and external barriers to its use. 
Capturing heterogeneity: The preference for customized tools 
and techniques 
Performance measurement within social enterprises was an 
accepted feature of organizational life. Our survey found that 59% 
of social enterprises already measured their social impact and a 
further 33% were planning to do so. Collecting evidence and 
measuring impact was an extremely important process both 
internally to improve working practices and externally to attract 
funding. This was evidenced by a large health and wellbeing social 
enterprise who were using impact data to market their services: 
Our marketing is being able to evidence why people should 
buy what we're offering, so actually collecting that 
evidence is extremely important to us, and making sure 
that the impact is needed by local authorities and by 
individuals.  
Whilst the principle of performance measurement was accepted, 
our findings identified a variety of different interpretations and 
uses of measurement tools (see Table 1). There was no ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to measuring performance and value. Instead, 
performance measurement tools and techniques were frequently 
tailored to the particular contextual features and dynamics of 
each social enterprise. Social enterprises often developed 
customized tools, and our survey found that two-fifths of survey 
respondents (40%) used their own internal tools and techniques 
to measure performance. This included methods that encouraged 
‘bottom up’ engagement with users through user feedback, case 
studies and user forums. A qualitative user-based approach was 
often considered the most appropriate way to capture activity, as 
described by an organization delivering services to tackle social 
exclusion: 
I think it's about getting it from the people themselves 
who are using the facility rather than just doing stats and 
data. I think that proves nothing really.  
Customized tools included different metric-based techniques to 
capture the impact of organizational interventions. These were 
often based on established scales, including the 
Table 1 : The use of measurement tools by SEIF investees (survey 
respondents only) 
Measure of social impact % of survey resopndents 
Internal tools/systems 40 
SROI 30 
Other 4 
Not yet selected a tool 33 
Do not measure social impact 8 
 
Warwick Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) used to 
capture the effectiveness of a small counseling intervention, and 
the General Practice Assess.ment Questionnaire to gather 
outcomes on a nursing and support service. Measurement tools 
were often chosen on the basis that they are contextually 
appropriate to organizational values, goals and working practices, 
as explained by a large health and wellbeing social enterprise: 
The evaluative tool will be used wherever we're working … 
we've got to have a tool which allows [staff] to use their 
normal processes to gather data.  
Alongside these customized tools, approaches to measurement 
were frequently led by the requirements of funders. For those 
funded by Local Authorities or the NHS, measuring impact was 
often shaped by commissioner targets, often referred to as Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). Performance measurement tended 
to involve monthly reports to the funding body that built on 
defined outputs, for example the number of reduced hospital 
admissions as a result of the social enterprise intervention. This 
included a social enterprise delivering healthcare to socially 
excluded groups that had designed their performance 
measurement around commissioner funding and contractual 
requirements: 
We have to deliver targets to the board so we have to 
report back on our quality agenda to make sure that we're 
on track, that we're performing against our five-year 
contract to demonstrate that … we're spending the money 
appropriately.  
Customized tools were therefore favored by both our survey and 
case study respondents; however, our survey found that nearly a 
third (30%) of social enterprise organizations were using SROI, 
either on its own or in addition to customized tools. Despite SROI 
being encouraged by the Department of Health and 12% of SEIF 
investees being supported to use it, our research found a diverse 
range of interpretations of its use. Whilst there was some support 
for the tool, most social enterprises found that it presented them 
with a number of challenges. 
SROI: A square peg in a round hole? 
Our interviews identified some organizations that supported the 
use of SROI as their preferred measurement tool. This perspective 
was in recognition that undertaking an SROI brought value as an 
instrument for organizational learning. The potential benefits 
associated with SROI were based on enabling organizations to 
reflect on their own performance, and find opportunities to 
improve services for staff and users. One health and wellbeing 
social enterprise described the way in which SROI enabled them to 
realize their value and integrate this into their ongoing learning 
and development: 
I think that [SROI] made us really recognise the value, but 
more importantly it's good to do it because it can 
demonstrate the kind of difference it's making.  
This perspective was from an unsuccessful SEIF applicant who had 
received funding from their local healthcare commissioner to 
undertake SROI. The same organization had also successfully used 
SROI to support applications for funding: 
We did SROI on one strand [service], and we noticed such 
a difference, particularly in terms of the investment of £1 
and the return would be £8.60 … So having that to support 
us with documents that we were putting forward for 
[funding].  
However, the majority of social enterprises interviewed (including 
those who received support from the SEIF for SROI training) were 
critical of SROI. The grounds for this criticism centered on three 
areas: the conflicting assumptions between SROI practices and 
social enterprise values; the practical problems of SROI; and the 
value of SROI to commissioners (and a wider external audience). 
Conflicting assumptions 
Using financial proxies to measure the outcomes of social 
enterprise activities was for some interviewees considered 
inappropriate. This was due to the diverse nature of the groups 
they serve and the dynamic contexts in which they are situated 
(Hart and Houghton, 2007). Their main impacts are often focused 
around ‘soft’ outcomes, for example improving a person's 
well-being or confidence. These are intangible impacts that many 
of our interviewees felt could not be measured in financial terms. 
This was especially the case for ‘well being’ services, the principles 
of which were based on a user centered approach to encourage 
happiness and confidence building. Using financial proxies to 
measure these social activities was considered inappropriate, as 
evidenced by a social care social enterprise that had used SROI: 
I think it was just this formula … you needed to then find a 
cost of what you were doing within an equivalent service, 
so the NHS. And there wasn't an equivalent cost. It's such 
a broad area, you know? I suppose it was just that, sort of, 
vagueness of [SROI] I didn't like.  
Finding financial proxies was therefore a significant barrier to 
undertaking an SROI analysis, and organizational contexts were 
such that they were unable to obtain or develop the necessary 
robust financial comparative data. For those organizations that 
were only just starting up or had not yet begun trading, 
undertaking a SROI (even a forecast SROI) was considered 
especially problematic as it required them to generate 
performance data that speculated on the benefits of a service not 
yet in existence. The above respondent who had received a SEIF 
investment to set up a new social enterprise and was required to 
undertake SROI, commented that it was ‘very hard to do an 
assessment of something that's not happening’. 
Practical constraints 
Interviewees also highlighted the practical implementation issues 
associated with SROI, including the significant time and cost 
resources it required. This was a particular challenge for small 
organizations with limited capacity, especially those run mainly by 
volunteers. For example, a small health and wellbeing social 
enterprise felt that it was not possible to undertake expensive and 
time consuming impact measurement (although may consider 
SROI in the future): 
I think up to now we've mainly been running the project 
with volunteers rather than paid staff and so what we're 
able to do is not an awful lot … Most of the time is 
involved in providing the service. To be able to look at 
some of these other things is perhaps a luxury.  
The cost and time required for an SROI could also not be justified 
by other organizations, both large social care providers and small 
well being services: 
I think was it Jamie Oliver's Fifteen, I think they spent 
something like £45,000 on their social return on 
investment and we were like, £45,000? We can do a lot of 
good with that.  
It costs money to implement, it costs time and money to 
keep going, it requires a good deal of thinking about … The 
problem with SROI is that measuring it makes you feel 
good but doesn't actually bring about an improved return.  
These findings suggested that the resources associated with SROI 
could be better used on service developments. As a result, the 
priority was more about developing cheaper and more applicable 
internal measurement tools, as had been done by a small health 
and wellbeing social enterprise: 
Our knowledge of the SROI tool is that it's a complex, 
time-consuming and expensive thing to use … when we 
just did the initial work on our evaluative framework we 
looked at a number of existing tools, and certainly SROI as 
it was then was just not going to deliver what we needed 
it to deliver.  
Alongside cost and capacity issues, capability problems were 
evident as organizations reported that they did not feel they could 
undertake an SROI due to its complexity. Some particularly 
struggled with its methodological processes, as evidenced by one 
respondent who had received SROI training through the SEIF: 
I mean, [SROI] is a really complex thing, isn't it? [During 
SROI training] they might as well have been speaking 
Swahili at one point … . It was just the methodology. It was 
incredibly complex.  
Overall, despite the Department of Health goal to encourage the 
use of SROI, our research found that SROI proved relatively 
unsuccessful due to these methodological and practical 
challenges. 
External challenges to SROI 
In addition to the ‘internal’ complexities of undertaking an SROI, 
most of our interview respondents felt that SROI was not a useful 
tool in helping them to secure new contracts. Overall, 
respondents felt that there was a lack of understanding of SROI 
amongst commissioner audiences. This was also echoed by some 
of the commissioners we interviewed, including a primary care 
commissioner: 
Whether there is a level of awareness amongst 
commissioners … Given the level of seniority of the group I 
was addressing recently, my impression is that there isn't 
universal understanding of SROI. I am sure there are 
individual commissioners who do.  
Of particular note, SROI was not widely understood or encouraged 
by commissioners because funding decisions were frequently 
based on internally developed Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
This was indicated by a primary care commissioner of a social 
enterprise delivering fitness programs: 
The data we want is based on their KPIs. We want to know 
how many people are in the organisation, sickness levels … 
weight loss etc.  
Within the current commissioning climate of imminent cuts to 
funding and competition from different providers, there was also 
an acceptance that demonstrating social value, including through 
SROI, was going to be important. In the context of social 
enterprises facing increased competition, including from private 
providers, the need to demonstrate evidence about impact 
became ever more pressing. There was, however, some concern 
that continued faith in SROI as the preferred technique within 
policy was underestimating the difficulties of using it, as expressed 
by a social enterprise support agency: 
[The Government] definitely wants to put some sort of 
requirement in place where you've got to measure your 
social impact, but they just need to decide what form it 
takes.  
Interpreting measurement tools and SROI 
The findings presented above illustrate that capturing the 
performance of social enterprise organizations is important, yet 
complex and open to a variety of different interpretations. There 
exist a range of different tools and methods that inform how 
social enterprises measure their impact, including SROI. In 
England, SROI has been promoted by the Department of Health, 
including through the SEIF, as a way for social enterprises to 
record and communicate their social return. Our research has 
shown that despite the SEIF funding SROI training for some of its 
investees, some social enterprises are not utilizing it as the policy 
intended. Our survey identified a relatively high use of SROI 
among SEIF investees overall (at 30%), especially compared with 
the findings of previous surveys on social enterprises (e.g. 
Sheridan, 2011). However those that had used SROI found it a 
challenging, complex and time consuming process with minimal 
resulting benefits. 
The practical difficulties we identified with SROI appear to support 
previous work (e.g. Lingane and Olsen, 2004) showing how 
organizations are unlikely to spend valuable time and resources on 
impact assessment unless it is of significant value. Rather than 
providing a useful management tool, SROI was in many respects 
interpreted as irrelevant, a burden, or as something that got in the 
way of delivery (Social Enterprise Partnership UK, 2003). On this 
basis, most felt that internal and customized tools and techniques 
developed by the organizations themselves were deemed more 
relevant and responsive (Thomas, 2004) and better suited to 
day-to-day delivery in the ways they could be integrated into 
activities, organizational goals and available resources (Bull, 2007; 
Burns et al., 2008). This reflects the diversity of social enterprise 
organizations, especially within health and social care, in terms of 
their structure, objectives and outcomes (Hart and Houghton, 
2007). There is no one definitive or standardized way of 
measuring them and they instead require a wide range of tools 
and methods to define impact in a meaningful way (Hart and 
Haughton, 2007). 
The assumptions on which SROI is based appear to further 
highlight how performance measurement is often too ‘generalist’ 
in its approach. In this case, SROI was limited in capturing the 
distinctiveness of each organization (Paton, 2003), especially 
when attempting to measure ‘soft’ outcomes. Social return on 
investment techniques were found to conflict with social 
enterprise values and assumptions, which may reflect the 
continuing challenges of transferring methods originating in the 
private sector and from different contexts (here SROI originated 
from the US) into public and non-profit contexts. These 
organizations were not built on the business and financial 
principles underpinning SROI (Bull, 2007; Paton,) but on different 
epistemological assumptions; those emphasizing qualitative 
experience and tacit knowledge that may be unexpressed and 
immeasurable. This presents a further critique to the assumptions 
underpinning SROI that social enterprise organizations can be 
seen as systems of rational causality, with inputs leading to 
outputs, which can be ‘objectively’ assessed (Ridley Duff et al., 
2011). Here, such notions of ‘blended’ value based on a single 
monetary scale were in tension with interpretive images of 
organizations which could not be easily monetised or made 
commensurable (Westall, 2009). 
These findings show that the nature, extent and effectiveness of 
attempts to capture social value were largely not shaped by the 
SEIF and its application process but by internal organizational 
factors. The lack of ongoing use or understanding of SROI also 
draws attention to external contextual factors that shape the 
utilization of such techniques. Health and social care 
commissioners often refer to Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
when evaluating service providers and making funding decisions. 
Such evaluation is frequently built into contracts and impact 
assessment is often a prerequisite for initial, continued or 
additional funding for social enterprise projects (Hart and 
Haughton, 2007). Although SROI has been promoted as a way for 
social enterprises to better negotiate new contracts for service 
delivery (Department of Health, 2010), in reality internal 
measurement systems and external performance targets are still 
favored by commissioners. 
Evidently, commissioning bodes are still reluctant to risk what 
they perceive to be untried models. This being the case, not only 
does SROI face an uphill struggle for legitimacy but it may be a 
misplaced project. For this to change, it may be necessary to 
stipulate the use of specific social impact tools in public service 
contracts. This is something that has been advocated by some 
(e.g. Nicholls, 2007). However, by reviewing the use of SROI 
among SEIF organizations, we have shown that imposing the use 
of SROI on social enterprises is not always successful. Simply 
providing SROI training and financial support does not necessarily 
lead to successful implementation. Furthermore, if SROI is to be 
championed as the main tool for measuring social impact and a 
tool to support social enterprises negotiate with funders (e.g. 
Department of Health, 2010), there is a need for further training 
among funding bodies. 
In practice, to reduce the gap between national policy and local 
interpretation with regards to measuring outcomes, a greater 
acceptance of value pluralism is required. Much more work needs 
to be done on practical issues such as understanding the 
appropriate governance models for different kinds of social 
enterprises. It also requires finance providers and funders to move 
beyond the current narrow focus on monetary value creation. 
Unfortunately this is likely to be difficult in the current climate of 
health and social care reform as economic pressures and the 
dominance of existing metrics mean funders have the potential to 
become more prescriptive and directive (Holden, 2004; Westall, 
2009). The use of metrics such as social impact bonds might well 
suggest a different way of capturing social value however in the 
current climate there is likely to be little room for looking at the 
difficult dimensions of value creation and ways of talking about 
these issues. The result of this may well lead to further tensions 
with the potential erosion of existing values and local meanings 
(Westall, 2009). 
Even so, broader ideas of social value are needed that incorporate 
the co-production of knowledge between local contexts, social 
enterprises and those they serve (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; 
Knox and Worpole, 2007). Ways to bridge the divide might include 
measuring the social value of entire systems of social enterprise 
(Ridley Duff et al., 2011). The broad idea of ‘Return on Investment’ 
could have multiple numerators combining monetary, qualitative 
and narrative measures that may reflect more specific and direct 
returns to different stakeholders. Social value chains or social 
accounting might also provide alternative ways to look at value 
creation by third sector actors (Westall, 2009). 
Conclusion 
The use of measurement tools within social enterprise 
organizations is contextually bound. The heterogeneity of social 
enterprises means that they often struggle to fit with standardized 
performance measurement tools and techniques. SROI has been 
accepted as an internationally recognized measurement tool for 
social enterprise within UK policy and beyond and has been 
promoted by the Department of Health as a favored 
measurement tool. Despite the high aspirations associated with it, 
we have found some social enterprises and those that commission 
health and social care services are not utilizing the tool as 
anticipated. These findings support the ongoing debates that 
practical and ideological factors often act as a barrier to the 
uptake of measurement tools by social enterprises (Peatte and 
Morley, 2008; Sheridan, 2011). 
This study offers a significant contribution to the literature on the 
use of SROI by social enterprises and provides an important 
contribution to assessments of the validity, robustness, and 
appropriateness of performance measurement within social 
enterprises more generally. Evidently, it was conducted at a 
particular point in time, within the specific context of health and 
social care and with a group of organizations that applied to SEIF. 
In the UK, changes in the policy environment are likely to result in 
further expectations for social enterprises to use impact 
measurement tools, such as SROI, to demonstrate the ‘added 
value’ they create. If SROI or any other social impact measures are 
to be successful, more support is needed to recognize and enact 
their use. 
Despite being UK oriented, these findings also have implications 
for the implementation of social investment strategies across 
public services, and for other welfare regimes in Europe and 
beyond where efforts to promote social enterprise are underway 
(Fazzi, 2012). They highlight the implicit value tensions and 
conflicts associated with multi-stakeholder governance models 
and show how much measurement literature and practice related 
to the third sector is currently dominated by the focus on 
monetizable outcomes at the expense of practitioner based 
measures and broader kinds of value. A more thorough 
understanding of value could better articulate the drivers and 
functioning of social enterprise activity. As such, policy and 
practice could be based on a more realistic understanding that any 
use and development of measurement systems needs to explicitly 
recognize the strategic objectives, context and influences of an 
organization. 
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